Barton vs Criminal Acts

How do you redress injustice when protection for their acts is provided by the court?

The Trustee and Court were provided on more than one occasion, as is documented in pacer, with all the “transparent material facts” that confirmed revenge litigation – malicious fraud – theft by deception – negligence – but not limited to.

Although it appears Barton principles would not allow any trustee or trustees’ attorneys to protection for their acts if in violation of criminal statues was the court in violation of any oaths by providing protection for their acts?

Would such order of protection constitute a violation of state and federal criminal codes Title 14 and Title 18? Would this be an obstruction of any opportunity of justice to prevail in my behalf?

Having taken an oath did the Court have an obligation to uphold the Constitution? An obligation under the La Rules of Professional Conduct to report prior attorney and/or judicial misconduct the court was noticed of? Did the court have an obligation to redress injustice when the material facts confirm judgments were obtained by malicious fraud? When there was believed sufficient established material facts provided to the court documenting abuse of discretion?

What were the bankruptcy Trustees obligations to redress injustice once he was copied all the established record confirming the abuse and injustice?

You be the Judge

In a final attempt to redress the injustice please review the letter I forwarded to the trustee Mr. (name redacted pending complaint determination), which prompted a fourth motion for protection for their actions. Please see the email I forwarded to USTP Donna McFatter in an effort to redress to no avail. You be the Judge.

What do you opinion of attorneys seizing assets prior to a final appeal process misrepresenting in briefs the property will be put back in production and that production does not occur until years later and thousands of dollars of damages incurred due to non production?

Are the courts inclined to protect attorneys even when there is undisputed evidence of wrongful acts? How would a victim of wrongful acts bring about judicial transparency? Was the judicial system broken in my case? How do you survive injustice? Can you take a very negative experience and forge an effort of change promoting judicial transparency?

You be the Judge – Since the Court during a prior hearing expressed a desire that transparency was of importance please see the following which was my last Motion filed as I presented (transparency) nearly every material fact believed to confirm wrongful acts, that according to statutes of criminal law were violations, that is viewed in the web site:

Sue Bell Opposition to Trustees Motion for Sanctions and other Relief – attaching exhibits 1-25 : 26-50 : 51-79 : Bell’s Motion to Supplement transcript pages of WDLA Judge Hanna’s concerns . You decide whether you would have provided a protective order. Although the Court did not verbally mention sanctions, the order was typed with sanctions?

Note: Out of necessity, due to litigation filed in haste, this family trust bankruptcy petition was filed in 2002, with a separate adversary trial issue occurring in 2004. It is the 2nd quarter of 2011 and the bankruptcy case is still not closed. This trust was the first trust ever allowed into Bankruptcy court in the state of Louisiana, and the case has since not been treated as a  Chapter 7, as the petition that was filed says it is. Throughout this web site, material facts confirm an adversary proceeding was commenced to recover for beneficiaries that were not creditors. (Please see drop down Breached Justice – Title 11 § 548,and Societies Laws – Criminal Statutes, Attorney Conduct, Standards of Malice to determine whether egregious circumstances prevailed. ) Determine for yourself whether the trustee acted outside the scope of the professional rules and whether tort acts occurred, and what obligation to the trust  the trustee had once I personally copied him with all the material facts of violations, if he was unaware prior.

Special Note: In pro se capacity, as linked to throughout this site, I attached the material evidence to motions I filed with the new sitting court. My pro se filings began as early as 8/16/06 Dkt 57, 7/23/10 Dkt 188. In furtherance of seeking a redress for injustice, I copied the bankruptcy trustee, all sibling beneficiaries, and authorities (Office of U. S. Trustee – Shreveport, LA : Office U.S. Trustee – New Orleans, LA : U. S. Attorney Office – Lafayette, LA : Exec Office US Trustee Criminal Enforcement – Washington, DC : LA Office Disciplinary Counsel – Baton Rouge, LA : LA Office Attorney General – Baton Rouge, LA : La. Supreme Court – New Orleans, LA); to ensure all parties were served with the actual material facts, established in the proceeding, and believed to confirm wrongful acts, alleged criminal violations and violations of the Rules of Professional Judicial and attorney conduct codes.

Although there is case precedent that any court has the authority to void any judgment obtained by fraud, the court did not take action to do so. The trustee made no effort to correct the wrongful acts. As far as I know, no sibling beneficiary made any effort to right any wrong. You be the Judge as to the Motion and material fact exhibits of fraud I presented to the Court – would you determine the trustee and his attorneys should be granted protection from their actions?


The Trust filed a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.

Title 11 – Chapter 7 – subchapter § 704 that provides in part;

Liquidation under Chapter 7 “liquidation” proceeding, those assets that are not exempt are collected and liquidated (reduced to money). The proceeds are distributed to creditors.

That is not occurring in this case. Is it questionable whether the trustee is acting outside the normal scope of professional rules, and according to Barton, would then not be eligible for any protection?

Was it appropriate that attorneys finally, on their fourth attempt, received protection from their actions in spite of the overwhelming  record, actually established before the same court, as to violations of La. Professional Code of Conduct and statutes of criminal law?

During the last hearing I verbally advised the court that I had filed two criminal complaints, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel had opened a case, and the Judicial Commission had provided instructions on how to file a complaint against judicial officers. I supplemented my Motion with transcript pages from WDLA status conference whereby the Court stated that Courts have an obligation to report any knowledge of violations of professional conduct to the ODC.

“The Courts have defined fraud as encompassing a broad range of human behavior and any conduct calculated to deceive, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, by word of mouth, by look, or by gesture. Fraud includes the suppression of the truth, as well as the presentation of false information (In re Witt (1991) 145 Ill. 2d 380, 583 N.E. 2d 526, 531, 164 Ill. Dec. 610). See also In re Frederick Edward Strufe, Disciplinary case no. 93 SH 100,”

“Where the Court stated that fraud has been broadly defined as anything calculated to deceive. It should be noted that the definition of fraud applies to everything an attorney may be engaged in, whether in court or in his office”


“The fraud, libel, slander, defamation, and civil criminal financial torts were made by attorneys and their law firms. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill. App 3d 477, 410 N.E. 2d 626 (1980) In the cases cited herein the level of fraud, slander, defamation, and civil criminal financial torts embraced that species of fraud which successfully defiled the court itself, so that the judicial machinery could not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases.”

“Fraud upon the court is “fraud which . . . subvert[s] the integrity of the Court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.” Evans v. Gunter, 294 S.C. 525, 529, 366 S.E.2d 44, 46 (Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Lightsey & Flanagan, supra, at 408). It has also been defined as “fraud that does, or at least attempts to, defile the court itself.”

Important note – for several years now the trustee and his attorneys have petitioned the courts several times, unsuccessfully, for “chilling” sanctions against me (believed hoping to silence the record) and for protection for themselves from future litigation that would list them as defendants.

This trust case, the first ever allowed into La Bankrutpcy Court, without any issue before the court since February 2010, is believed was long over due for closing. Others opinion the non closure of this case is that these attorneys and trustee had not yet succeeded in gaining protection for their actions or that perhaps there is also an effort to run prescriptions.

Their most notable request that supports their actions were meant to be malicious was their request forchilling sanctions. In my complaints to law enforcement, requesting an investigation of this case evidence, I stated my concern for my safety and well being.

“I argued I was forced into defense under threat of “CHILLING” HARM. I am threatened with sanctions, contempt of Court, and prevention of my entitled civil rights to ongoing actions that are not before this Court. Given the chilling harm that is sought against me, I have no recourse but to defend myself with adverse arguments treating the moving parties as they are named “defendants” in my actions on matters that are not properly before this Court.  Defendant’s who certainly confirmed their hostility to me, on record, for six years.

Important note – In my last reply brief to the court, I argued that Barton appeared not to offer protection to the trustee and his attorneys if tortious acts were committed. I  further argued according to research that Barton provided that trustees and their attorneys can be sued without leave of the court.

I attached to my brief the many exhibits of material facts (that are linked to in this web story) established in that very jurisdiction, believed that reasonable persons would agree upon review, that violations of professional conduct occurred. You be the judge did violations of criminal statutes also occur?

I, in pro se capacity, argued in my brief against the Barton Principles that would offer adversary attorneys or the trustee protection from litigation for any wrongful acts:

“When Mr. Ackermann argued the Barton principles afforded the Trustee’s attorneys protection (from their own wrongful actions), the WDLA Court commented “I don’t know what I think about Barton I would have to review it” (see transcript supplemental exhibit C).”

“It is really important to note, in spite of research in support of Barton principles providing a trustee can be sued without leave, and in spite of Trustee’s attorneys attempts to wrongfully inflame this Court, I have not named Trustee Sandoz in any suit (see exhibits 11 -12 ).”

“A limited exception to the rule announced in Barton was codified in 28 U.S.C. § 959(a). See, e.g., Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (6th Cir. 1993) (describing 959(a) exception as “limited”). Section 959(a) states: [t]rustees, receivers or managers of any property, including debtors in possession, may be sued, without leave of the court appointing them, with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such property. Such actions shall be subject to the general equity power of such court so far as the same may be necessary to the ends of justice, but this shall not deprive a litigant of his right to trial by jury.”

I went on to argue:

“The factual material evidence documented in my suits is a matter of public domain record that confirms my suit damage claims involve post petition damage claims, and the trustee was carrying on business, thus 28 USC 959 controls the circumstances. In accordance with 28 USC 949 as a litigant I should not be deprived my right to a trial by jury.”

“See Gary Arthur Kish, individually and d/b/a Kish Sand Gravel No 82-00428 41 B.R. 620, 11 C.B.C. 2d 888, 12 B.C.D. 446 “Since the lawsuit involves post petition activities of the debtor and the trustee, and since the trustee is “carrying on business” connected with the property of the debtor, 28 USC § 959 controls the case. That statute provides as follows:”

“(a). That provision provides that “[t]rustees, receivers or managers of any property, including debtors in possession, may be sued, without leave of the court appointing them, with respect to any of their acts or transaction in carrying on business connected with such property. Such actions shall be subject to the general equity power of such court so far as the same may be necessary to the ends of justice, but this shall not deprive a litigant of his right to trial by jury.

“Additional exception to the Barton doctrine “where the trustee commits a tort of any sort.” See U. and I. Inc v Fitzgerald (In re Campbell), 13 B.R. 974 (Bankr,.D. Idaho 1981).”

“Reason and rationale supports if a Trustee would not have authority to commit any tort crimes, likewise law firms employed by the Trustee would not have authority to commit tort crimes.”

“1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.04 [1] [b] (15th ed. 1978).”

“The trustee asserts that 28 USC § 959 (a) was intended to allow suit without leave if court only when the trustee is sued on a contract he had made or for some wrong he had done, but not where the lawsuit would interfere with the title, possession, control, liquidation or distribution of estate assets., However, no case is cited to support this reading. The cases found support the view that 28 USC § 959 means what its plain words say: “trustees……may be sued, without leave of court appointing them, with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such property.”

You be the Judge- did the court in its authority believe the principles of blind justice – equal justice according to law – was best served by providing a court order to protect these attorneys?

Did the evidence that I presented to the Court substantiate fraudulent misrepresentation?

Did the established evidence in the court’s very own jurisdiction, that I presented to the Court substantiate a violation of professional conduct, a violation of judicial conduct?

Is there any acceptable reason why a court would ignore the material evidence that has been established?

In my argument against Barton Principles:

If the facts of a case, in the form of material evidence, substantiating criminal violations, fraudulent misrepresentation of expert testimony to obtain a judgment that would personally prosper attorneys was presented against any argument of Barton Principles.

In a Court of law, what should be the priority of the presiding judge? Protecting attorneys from litigation or due consideration of the factual evidence established when at least an appearance of criminal actions occurred in obtaining judgments?

Attorneys, in the surrounding area of Lafayette Louisiana, Jeffrey Ackermann, Glenn Marcantel, and trustee Mr. (name redacted pending complaint determination), on three separate occasions unsuccessfully motioned for sanctions against me, and for a court order to protect them from future litigation for their alleged wrongful acts in that jurisdiction.

In February of 2011, believing the litigation against me to be closing, I began my journey of healing, filing three separate suits in federal District court (WDLA) arguing denial of civil rights amongst other claims for damages.

Because of my filings in Federal WDLA court, and their having direct knowledge that I would be pursing suits with believed legitimate causes of action, these attorneys filed another motion for sanctions and also a pleading for an order that would provide them relief from suits arguing the Barton Principles.

Although this Court did not see fit to award sanctions against me on multiple prior requests for same, it did during the last hearing provide them with a court order of protection.

I can not file another suit against Jeffrey Ackermann, Glenn Marcantel, or the trustee Mr. (name redacted pending complaint determination) without first seeking the approval of the trial court. The court order of protection is specific to me. Thus others may file suit.

My argument (in part)

“What is most alarming is a record replete with evidence that reveals defendant’s apparent flagrant disregard for factual material evidence, conflicts of interest, ignoring of Civil Codes of Procedure, ignoring Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and ignoring  the required professional behavior, in accordance with La. Rules of Professional Conduct. Actions that confirm defendant’s willful, and shameless display of unfair practices.

Would you, the reader, agree it appears I have been a been a victim of a masterful ability to disadvantage, and most importantly what appears to be defendants self assurance they can successfully circumvent the law and the judicial machinery.”


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